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The avalanche -of medical malpractice lawsuits in recent years
against both private practitioners -and medical institutions1 has
resulted in a heightened awareness of each patient as an adversary
in a possible lawsuit should something go wrong either in a medical
procedure or in general medical care.2  Naturally, medical pro-
fessionals and administrators have adopted a thoroughly defensive
attitude toward these lawsuits. An illustration of this attitude is
the strategy outlined -by an assistant director of a large metropoli-
tan hospital:
Reduced to essentials, the proper stance toward possible
malpractice claims should be precautionary-and toward
actual claims, reactive. The best precautions consist of an
insistence on clear and prudent policy and procedural state-
ments, on factual and well-documented records, on protec-
tive but reasonable policies on the release of medical
information, on regular reminders and cautions to medical
staff members, on timely and thorough investigations of in-
cidents and accidents, on a -close liaison with insurers and
investigators, and on whole hearted cooperation with legal
counsel.3
Following such advice, hospitals have adopted a strategy of docu-
* The author gratefully acknowledges the 'assistance of Irene M.
Sauter, R.N., U.S. Army (Ret.), Director of Nursing Services, Carlisle Hos-
pital, Carlisle, Pa., in the preparation of this introduction.
1. In New York State 407 malpractice suits were filed against private
practitioners or medical institutions in 1968. During 1973, the number rose
to 773-a 90% increase. TIME, July 15, 1974, at 78.
Allied to this rise in malpractice suits is a disquieting tendency of juries
in some circumstances:
Nor, apparently, is negligence the only ground for a successful
suit. Juries seem to be taking the attitude that when a patient dies
during surgery his family is entitled to compensation, and they are
calling upon insurance companies to provide it.
Id.
2. The beginning of this road for hospitals and other medical institu-
tions came with Judge Rutledge's historic opinion in President and Direc-
tors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942),
wherein the arguments for charitable immunity for medical care institutions
were met and overturned. Since then a majority of jurisdictions have fol-
lowed this lead and the trend seems irreversible. W. PRossER, LAW oF ToRTs
§ 133 (4th ed. 1971). The author lists 31 states which have abolished charit-
able immunity. Id. at 996 n.68.
3. Eisenberg, Fortifying the Hospital's Legal Defense in Malpractice
Suits, 41 HOsPITALs 49 (1967).
mentation and detailed record keeping as key tools in their fight
against malpractice and general negligence lawsuits.
The hospital accident or incident report 4 is a routinely used
record of untoward events within the hospital. The keynote of this
procedure is full, detailed reporting which in turn will permit an
explanation by hospital administrators of the supposed causes of
any extraordinary events or conditions within the hospital. In its
"Accreditation Manual for Hospitals" the Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Hospitals recognizes several purposes for medical
records including, among others, assistance in protecting the legal
interests of the patient, hospital and responsible practitioner.6 Yet,
"[t] he essential premise is that management is responsible for what
happens on the job."
7
The purpose of this Comment is to examine two alternate uses
of accident or incident reports from the vantage point of the hospi-
tal as defendant in medical malpractice and general negligence
suits. This Comment will first examine the admissibility of the
reports as a record or document prepared in the regular course of
business. Thereafter this Comment will examine the problems en-
countered by the hospital if it seeks to protect the documents from
its adversary on the basis that the reports are privileged communi-
cations between the attorney and the hospital-client.8 Although the
factual determination as to which category a particular record
belongs is often difficult, the legal ramifications are clear. As
stated in Schmitt v. Emery:
There is a distinction often difficult to make in practice,
between documents prepared as records by an employee
4. "Incident" is broader in scope (including a loss or robbery of per-
sonal effects of a patient) than "accident." The use of either or both terms
in this Comment will connotate any departure from normal hospital routine.
A working definition of an incident is provided by the American Hospital
Association: "An incident is any happening which is not consistent with
the routine operation of the hospital or the routine care of a particular pa-
tient. It may be an accident or a situation which might result in an acci-
dent." AMERICAN HOSPrAL ASSOCIATION AND NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL,
SAFETY GUIDE FOR HEALTH CARE INSTITUTIONS 33 (1972) ("Incident Report
Form").
5. Although it possesses no licensing authority, its prestige can sub-
stantially affect the professional standings of hospitals. Such accreditation
by the Commission is granted only upon following its recommendations.
Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249, 250 (D.D.C. 1970).
6. JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS, ACCREDITATION
MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS; HOSPITAL ACCREDITATION PROGRAM 93 (1972 revi-
sion).
7. AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION AND NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL,
SAFETY GUIDE FOR HEALTH CARE INSTITUTIONS 33 (1972).
8. These reports provide, however, a golden opportunity for the n=l-
practice or negligence plaintiff for discovery of information, although courts
have been loathe to admit hospital accident reports from lower-ranking em-
ployees as representative admissions. See, e.g., Cox v. State, 3 N.Y.2d 693,
698, 148 N.E.2d 879, 881, 171 N.Y.S.2d 818, 822 (1958). ("No member of the
hospital staff had authority to bind the State by admissions based upon
hearsay."); see C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 267 (2d ed. 1972).
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pursuant to the employer's direction in the regular course
of business and those prepared under the direction and ad-
vice of the attorney as a communication for use in con-
nection with his rendition of professional service. The one
is a business record without privilege of any sort; the other
a communication between attorney and client.9
Since a record cannot be accorded status in each category simul-
taneously, 10 the hospital's task is first to decide upon the use it
wishes to make of the reports and then to endeavor to follow the
courts' mandates as to the prescribed format for creating and keep-
ing the records for the particular use chosen.
I. HOSPITAL ACCIDENT REPORTS AS REGULARLY
KEPT BusiNEss RECORDS
A. The Business Records Exception in Generat
Hospital accident reports are clearly hearsay and any attempt
to offer them into evidence is squarely confronted by the hearsay
rule and its prohibition against introduction of out-of-court state-
ments offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted therein."
However, under appropriate circumstances these records should be
admissible under the long recognized business records exception to
the hearsay rule.' 2 Although this exception had its origins in the
early English common law, today in the United States the exception
is largely statutory.3
9. 211 Minn. 547, 553, 2 N.W.2d 413, 416 (1942).
10. The business records exception to the hearsay rule allows admis-
sion to a document or record ordinarily hearsay. The privilege accorded
to communications of the client in an attorney-client relationship is a rule
of exclusion governing otherwise admissible evidence. Thus, a record or
report cannot be both admitted into evidence and withheld as privileged.
11. C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENcE §§ 246, 313 (a) (2d ed. 1972); 5
J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1361 (3rd ed. 1940); 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1707,
1766 (3rd ed. 1940).
12. See Picker X-Ray Corp. v. Frerker, 405 F.2d 916, 924 (8th Cir.
1969).
13. In England starting in the 1600's businessmen's "shop books" were
allowed into evidence for specified uses in order to circumvent the early
common law's prohibition of a party as a witness. Statutory bounds were
placed on this self-serving exception in 1609 (7 Jac. 1, c. 12). A distinct
and broader exception arose which admitted entries of third parties, since
died, in records regularly kept in the course of a business. In England these
two exceptions merged and covered all business entries, party or non-party,
alive or deceased.
In the United States a dichotomy arose between the strict "shop book"
rules and the regularly kept records rules. This dichotomy remains in ves-
tigial form in some jurisdictions, but a reasonable accommodation with mod-
ern business entries statutes has usually been found. See C. McCoRmIcx,
LAW OF EiVMZNCE § 305 (2d ed. 1972); 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1518 (3rd
ed. 1940).
Among the several modern statutory formulations regulating
the admission of regularly kept records, section 2 of the Uniform
Business Records as Evidence Act 1 4 is the most widely adopted.1 5
That Act provides that business records of acts, conditions or events
shall be competent evidence if their identity and mode of prepara-
tion are testified to by the custodian or other qualified witness.
Under the Act it must be shown: (1) that the record was made
in the regular course of business; (2) that it was made at or near
the time of the act, condition or event; and (3) that the sources
of information, method and time of preparation were, in the court's
opinion, such as to justify its admission.
The Federal Business Records Act"8 currently governs admis-
sibility in the federal courts and also has been adopted by some
states.1 7 That Act is similar to the Uniform Business Records as
Evidence Act in that the memorandum or record of any act, trans-
action, occurrence or event must have been made at or within a
reasonable time after said act, transaction, occurrence or event, and
that the memorandum or record must have been made in the
regular course of the business. The Federal Business Records Act
differs from the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act in that
it qualifies the "regular course" of the business by adding that it
must have been the regular course of such business to make such
a memorandum or record at the time of the act, transaction, occur-
rence or event or within a reasonable time thereafter. 8 It also
14. 9A U.L.A. 506 (1965).
15. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2262 (1956); CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1270-
72 (West 1968); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-180 (Supp. 1973); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, § 4310 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.36 (Supp. 1974-75); GA.
CODE ANN. § 38-711 (1974 rev.); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 622-5 (Supp. 1973);
IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 9-413 to -416 (1948); IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.28 (Supp.
1974-75); MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2146 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 600.01-.04 (1947); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 490.660-690 (1952); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. §§ 93-801-1 to -4 (1964); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 25-12108 to -12111
(1965); NEV. REv. STAT. § 51.135 (1971); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 521:1-5
(1955); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:82-34 to -37 (1952); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW §
4518 (McKinney 1963); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-08-01 (1960); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2317.40 (Baldwin 1971); OnE. REV. STAT. §§ 41.680-.710 (Rep. Part
1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, §§ 91a-d (1958); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-
19-13 (1970); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 19-7-11 (1969); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 24-712 to -715 (Supp. 1973); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3737e,
§§ 1-4 (Supp. 1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1700 (1973); V.I.C. ANN. tit.
5, § 932(13) (1957); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 5.45.010-.920 (1963); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. §§ 1-170 to -173 (1959).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1970).
17. ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 415 (1960); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-928 to -929
(Repl. Vol. 1962); M. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 59 (Repl. Vol. 1971); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 78 (1959); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-12 (Repl.
Vol. 1970); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 889.25 (West 1966).
Several other states have their own permutations of the Federal Act
and the Uniform Act; see IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 2-1656 to -1658 (Repl. Vol.
1968); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460 (1964); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 356
(1965); Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-151 (1972).
18. This "regular course of such business" theme was emphasized in
Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943), aff'g Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d
976 (2d Cir. 1942). See notes 30-31, 32-38 and accompanying text infra.
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differs from the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act
in that "[a] 11 other circumstances of the making of such writing or
record, including lack of personal knowledge by the entrant or
maker, may be shown to affect its weight, but such circumstances
shall not affect its admissibility.' 19
The proposed Federal Rules of Evidence,20 superseding the Pro-
posed Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates,
21
which, if adopted, would replace the Federal Business Records Act
22
in federal actions has substantially the same wording as the latter
Act. However, the new Act changes the wording of the Federal
Business Records Act from " [the] regular course of any business"
to "the course of a regularly conducted business activity." Should
the act be passed in this form, this change may have significant
ramifications in future interpretations of the federal business
records rule. This development will receive more thorough discus-
sion below.
23
The rationale of these modern business records statutes is to
promote convenience in the admission into evidence of business re-
cords which pass through numerous and sometimes unidentifiable
hands. Judge Learned Hand provided this explanation of the use
of business records statutes:
The routine of modern affairs, mercantile, financial and
industrial, is conducted with so extreme a division of labor
that the transactions cannot be proved at first hand with-
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1970).
20. Act to Establish Rules of Evidence for Certain Courts and Proceed-
ings, Rule 803 (b), H.R. 5463, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
21. Rule 803 (b) (1971 rev.), as reported in 56 F.R.D. 183 at 236.
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1970).
23. At the time of the writing of this Comment the Senate has not
acted on the House version of the Act. Looking beyond passage, it remains
to be seen how the courts will construe the new wording. See the discus-
sion of the "regular course of business" in Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109
(1943), aff'g Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1942), notes 30-38
and accompanying text infra, and the discussion of the possible ramifica-
tions of the new Act, notes 61-67 and accompanying text infra.
The Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 63 (13), in pertinent part, provide
for the admission of:
Writings offered as memoranda or records of acts, conditions or
events to prove the facts stated therein, if the judge finds that they
were made in the regular course of a business at or about the time
of the act, condition or event recorded, and that the sources of in-
formation from which they were made and the methods and cir-
cumstances of their preparation were such as to indicate their
trustworthiness.
No separate treatment will be made of the Uniform Rules as the several
business records acts heretofore enacted have been construed fairly consist-
ently.
out the concurrence of persons, each of whom can contrib-
ute no more than a slight part, and that part not depend-
ent on his memory of the event. Records, and records
alone, are their adequate repository, and are in practice ac-
cepted as accurate upon the faith of the routine itself, and
of the self-consistency of their contents. Unless they can
be used in court without the risk of calling those who at
all stages had a part in the transactions recorded, nobody
need ever pay a debt, if only his creditor does a large
enough business.
24
It remains for the party wishing to use business records statutes
to satisfy the requirements of the controlling statute as to particu-
lar reports or records offered into evidence. This Comment will
now discuss the applicability of business records statutes to accident
reports in general and to hospital accident reports specifically.
B. Admissibility of Accident Reports in General
1. Palmer v. Hoffman and Its Rule Against Admissibility
Until recently, most courts which have considered the admis-
sibility of various types of accident reports as business records
under the statutory provisions set out above have concluded that
such reports do not meet the requirements of these statutes.25 The
leading case for the position that accident reports are not admissible
as business records is Palmer v. Hoffman.20 In that case, which
construed the Federal Business Records Act,2 7 a railroad company
sought to admit as a business record a statement concerning a rail-
road crossing accident made two days later by the train engineer.
The statement was made in the course of an interview with a rail-
road superintendent and an agent of the Massachusetts Public
Utilities Commission. The decision of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit 28 and the Supreme Court of the
United States29 together provided three reasons for not admitting
the engineer's statement as a business record.
First, both courts held that the engineer's statement was not
made in the regular course of business. In Judge Frank's opinion,
the court of appeals emphasized that the "regular course of busi-
ness" has a settled judicial meaning, not a colloquial one which
24. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 18
F.2d 934, 937 (2d Cir. 1927).
25. E.g., Dilley v. Chesapeake & O.R.R., 327 F.2d 249, 251 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 824 (1964); Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976, 990 (2d
Cir. 1942), affd, Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943). See Laughlin,
Business Entries and the Like, 46 IowA L. REv. 276, 291 (1961).
26. 318 U.S. 109 (1943), aff'g Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976 (2d Cir.
1942).
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1970), formerly 28 U.S.C. § 695 (1940).
28. Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1942), aff'd, Palmer v.
Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
29. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943), aff'g Hoffman v. Palmer,
129 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1942).
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would allow interpretation by each business as to what its records
will be.30 The settled judicial meaning does not encompass a
regular practice of making records for the purpose of supplying evi-
dence in a probable lawsuit. 1
The Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Douglas, up-
held the court of appeals decision and amplified upon the use of
accident reports in the regular course of business. Mr. Justice
Douglas stated:
It [the engineer's statement] is not a record made for the
systematic conduct of the business as a business. An acci-
dent report may affect that business in the sense that it
affords information on which the management may act. It
is not, however, typical of entries made systematically or
as a matter of routine to record events or occurrences, to
reflect transactions with others, or to provide internal con-
trols. The conduct of a business commonly entails the pay-
ment of tort claims incurred by the negligence of its em-
ployees. But the fact that a company makes a business
out of recording its employees' versions of their accidents
does not put those statements in the class of records made
"in the regular course" of the business within the meaning
of the Act.
32
The Court adopted a narrow interpretation of the ordinary con-
duct of a business. Under this view only those activities which
further business interests in a commercial, profit-making sense
qualify for admission under the regularly kept records exception
to the hearsay rule. Regularity of recordation does not, ipso facto,
bring a record within the ambit of the statute.3s The Court held
that the management or operation of a business finds "its meaning
in the inherent nature of the business in question and in the
methods systematically employed for the conduct of the business
as a business. '  In the matter at hand, "[t] he business of the peti-
tioners is the railroad business." 35 On the other hand, the primary
utility of accident reports is in litigating and not in carrying on
a business.30 The Court distinguished the "regular course" of a
business from any "regular course" of conduct which may be fol-
lowed in a particular business.3 7 This generic use of the term
30. Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976, 983 (2d Cir. 1942), a"f'd, Palmer
v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
31. Id.
32. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 113 (1943), aff"g Hoffman v. Pal-
mer, 129 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1942).
33. Id. at 113, 115.
34. Id. at 115.
35. Id. at 111.
36. Id. at 114.
37. Id. This seems to be an insurmountable obstacle if courts follow
"business" attempts to circumscribe the feared motives to misrep-
resent as mentioned in the court of appeals opinion ss which would
be unleashed in a subjective interpretation of "business" in terms
of a particular company or corporation.
The second reason for not admitting the engineer's statement
as a business record, according to the court of appeals, was that
the statement lacked the necessary guarantees of trustworthiness
which are the foundation of the business records exception. 9 The
court held that such a statement "is dripping with motivations to
misrepresent. '40 The likelihood of a lawsuit and the understand-
able tendency of employees to eradicate or minimize traces of
liability running to both employer and employee militated against
the trustworthiness of the accident report.41 The subjective nature
of motivations not being conducive to hard and fast examination
and incapable of detection to a reasonable degree of certainty, the
mere possibility of a motive to misstate within a business record
the Palmer view. Courts wishing to avoid the severity of the Palmer rule
do so by closely examining the facts of each case and determining that the
facts evidence the trustworthiness of an accident report. The key has been
the absence of a motive to prepare the report solely for litigation purposes.
In effect, what the courts which have not followed Palmer have done is
to weigh the trustworthiness of non-litigation purposes and the mode of
preparation of a report against possible motivations to misrepresent because
of an anticipated lawsuit: e.g., Picker X-Ray Corp. v. Frerker, 405 F.2d 916
(8th Cir. 1969) (in dictum, routinely made reports to improve hospital pa-
tient services); Taylor v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 344 F.2d 281 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 831 (1965) (report required by law); United States v. New
York Foreign Trade Zone Operators, 304 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1962) (required
reports under a mandatory injury compensation system); Pekelis v. Trans-
continental & W. Air, Inc., 187 F.2d 122 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 951
(1951) (investigatory board's accident investigation reports). The most
reasonable reading of Palmer is that it does not create a blanket rule of
exclusion for accident reports because of their self-serving nature. C. Mc-
CORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 308, at 723 (2d ed. 1972).
38. See notes 40 and 41 and accompanying text infra.
39. Hoffman v. Palmer, 129, F.2d 976, 981 (2d Cir. 1942), aff'd, Palmer
v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
Wigmore posits three motives which secure a sufficient degree of proba-
ble trustworthiness to make records admissible: (1) the interest and pur-
pose of the entrant in the accuracy of the record; (2) the ease of detection
of falsity by persons dealing with the entrant; and (3) the risk of censure
or disgrace by a superior in the case of an entrant making a record under
a duty to the employer. 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1522 (3rd ed. 1940).
40. Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976, 991 (2d Cir. 1942), aff'd, Palmer
v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
41. Id. at 983, 986, 991. The court of appeals expressly decided this
and no more:
The statute does not permit the introduction in evidence of a
hearsay statement in the form of a written memorandum or report
concerning an accident if the statement was prepared after the acci-
dent occurred, where the person who makes the memorandum or
report knows at the time of making it that he is very likely, in a
probable law suit relating to that accident, to be charged with
wrongdoing as a participant in the accident, so that he is almost
certain, when making the memorandum or report, to be sharply
affected by a desire to exculpate himself and to relieve himself or
his employer of liability.
Id. at 991 (emphasis in the original).
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or report is enough to negative its use as an exception to the hearsay
rule.
The third reason for not admitting the engineer's statement as
a business record, implied in the Supreme Court's opinion, was that
there was no reliance by the railroad upon the statement in the
operation of its business.42 The Court asserted that the primary
utility of accident reports is in litigation and not in the everyday
operation of a railroad. 43 Drawing upon its narrow interpretation
of what constitutes the ordinary course of business44 the Court rea-
soned that, since the compilation of accident reports was outside
of the typical usage of records for business transactions and internal
controls43 and that since accident reports were not of the "inherent
nature" of the business in question,46 the accident report was not
a record made for the systematic conduct of the business. 47 In
other words, there was reliance upon the reports for purposes of
litigation but little or none with regard to the Court's narrow view
of the railroad's business. An accident report may be regularly
used and be a useful tool for informing counsel as to the circum-
stances of a mishap but reliance upon it, however extensive, will
not transform its nature (a part of the business of preparing
cases45 ) into the "inherent nature" of a business.
2. Recent Trends Toward Admissibility of Accident Reports in
General
Although most courts continue to follow the holding of Pal-
mer,49 some courts, spearheaded by the Court of Appeals for the
42. The court of appeals broaches little discussion of this point, but,
asserting accident reports' exclusion from the ambit of the Federal Business
Records Act (28 U.S.C. § 695 (1940), which now appears in 28 U.S.C. § 1732
(1970)), the court uses these words: "[D]ocuments, like the strongly moti-
vated engineer's statement involved here, . . . in no remote way resemble
the kind of record 'upon which the mercantile and industrial world relies
in the conduct of business.'" Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976, 985-86 (2d
Cir. 1942), aff'd, Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943), citing E. MOR-
GAN ET AL., THE LAw OF EvIDENcE: SOME PROPOSALS FOR ITS REFORM (1927).
43. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 114 (1943), aff'g Hoffman v. Pal-
mer, 129 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1942).
44. See notes 32-38 and accompanying text supra.
45. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 113 (1943), aff'g Hoffman v. Pal-
mer, 129 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1942).
46. Id. at 115.
47. Id. at 113.
48. Id. at 114.
49. Laughlin, Business Entries and the Like, 46 IowA L. REy. 276, 291
(1961). Pennsylvania followed the Palmer rationale in Neuman v. Pitts-
burgh Rys., 392 Pa. 640, 141 A.2d 581 (1958) (adopted Palmer without dis-
cussion in construing the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act).
Second Circuit, have started a trend favoring the admissibility of
accident reports. 0 These courts follow the general philosophy that
business records statutes, like other evidentiary statutes, should not
be interpreted too technically but rather should be interpreted in
favor of admissibility of even potentially biased evidence if, in the
court's discretion, the surrounding circumstances justify it.51 This
correlates with the fact that the hearsay rule is itself an exception
to the general rule that the trier of fact should have the advantage
of considering all relevant evidence, and that any reasonable loosen-
ing of a sometimes unduly restrictive hearsay rule should be
encouraged. 2 Thus, the key to approaching the admissibility of
accident reports is not to let form triumph -over substance but to
look into the circumstances of their creation and use. 3 The courts
which favor admissibility of accident reports have accepted a more
liberal definition of business which seemingly is more in harmony
with the intent of the various statutes than is the Palmer defini-
tion.54 These courts generally follow the definition offered by
Professor Wigmore:
[Business] may be defined to mean a course of transactions
performed in one's habitual relations with others and a
natural part of one's mode of obtaining a livelihood. It
would probably exclude, for instance, a diary of doings kept
50. E.g., Lindheimer v. United Fruit Co., 418 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1969);
Keohane v. New York Cent. R.R., 418 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1969); Gaussen v.
United Fruit Co., 412 F.Zd 72 (2d Cir. 1969); Picker X-Ray Corp. v. Frerker,
405 F.2d 916 (8th Cir. 1969); Taylor v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 344 F.2d 281 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 831 (1965); United States v. New York Foreign
Trade Zone Operators, 304 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1962); Puggioni v. Luckenbach
S.S. Co., 286 F.2d 340 (2d Cir. 1961); Terrasi v. S. Atl. Lines, Inc., 226 F.2d
823 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 988 (1955); Pekelis v. Transcontinental
& W. Air, Inc., 187 F.2d 122 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 951 (1951);
Gallup v. Sparks-Mundo Engineering Co., 43 Cal. 2d 1, 271 P.2d 34 (1954);
Chillstrom v. Trojan Seed Co., 242 Minn. 471, 65 N.W.2d 888 (1954); Fagan
v. Newark, 78 N.J. Super. 294, 188 A.2d 427 (1963).
51. Puggioni v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 286 F.2d 340, 344 (2d Cir. 1961);
Korte v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 1,91 F.2d 86, 91 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 868 (1951).
Judge Learned Hand offered this view: "[T]he disposition to rule out
evidence because it offends against some canon of the law of evidence is
to be discouraged; admission seldom does any harm, while exclusion often
proves extremely embarrassing in sustaining a judgment fundamentally
just." United States v. White, 124 F.2d 181, 186 (2d Cir. 1941).
52. Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 1941-1945, 59 Hum. L. REv. 481, 566
(1946). Referring to the Supreme Court's role in the Palmer decision, Mor-
gan observes: "[I]t is said that James B. Thayer once remarked in effect
that the greatness of the Supreme Court was not revealed in its decisions
on questions of evidence. Elaboration would be superfluous." Id. at 567.
53. United States v. New York Foreign Trade Zone Operators, 304 F.2d
792, 800 (2d Cir. 1962) (concurring opinion of Moore, Cir. J.), and cases
cited therein.
54. One commentator has noted that the Federal Business Records Act
has no language giving color to the Supreme Court's requirement that a
specific connection exist between the offered record and the type of business
conducted. Although not unreasonable in its holding, this commentator
adds, the decision is an example of judicial legislation. Laughlin, Business
Entries and the Like, 46 IowA L. REv. 276, 289, 291 (1961).
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merely for one's personal satisfaction; but it would not ex-
clude any regular record that was helpful, though not
essential nor usual in the same occupation as followed by
others. There is, therefore, no special imitation as to
the nature of the occupation.65
Courts following the more liberal definition of business have
also eluded the operation of the Palmer rule by relying on factual
distinctions, primarily circumstances indicating that accident re-
ports had a purpose other than for anticipation of litigation. The
Wigmore definition and multiple use of accident reports have
spawned the following excuses from the narrow interpretation of
the ordinary course of a business as stated in Palmer: that the acci-
dent report was made under statutory requirement pursuant to
regular procedure;58 that the accident report's primary purpose
was other than for preparation for litigation;57 that the accident
report was merely cumulative evidence, its maker being available
to testify on its contents and to identify the report; 58 and that the
accident report was made by an employee not responsible for the
accident and not therefore responsible to his employer for the
mishap.5 1
The proposed Federal Rules of Evidence60 may provide a basis
upon which the Supreme Court could distinguish the narrow inter-
pretation of "business" as set forth in Palmer v. Hoffman.6' In
55. 5 J. WIGMORE, EvinsNcs § 1523, at 370-71 (3rd ed. 1940) (emphasis
in the original).
56. Taylor v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 344 F.2d 281 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 831 (1965) (Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act); United States v. New York Foreign Trade Zone Operators, 304 F.2d
792 (2d Cir. 1962) (Federal Employees' Compensation Act).
57. Lindheimer v. United Fruit Co., 418 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1969)
(prime purpose of safety committee in promotion of adherence to careful
practices); Picker X-Ray Corp. v. Frerker, 405 F.2d 916 (8th Cir. 1969)
(dictum; reports more or less routinely made to improve treatment of pa-
tients or hospital procedure); Fagan v. Newark, 78 N.J. Super. 294, 188 A.2d
427 (1963) (for verification of accident claims and to promote more efficient
operation).
58. United States v. New York Foreign Trade Zone Operators, 304 F.2d
792 (2d Cir. 1962); Central R.R. v. Jules S. Sottnek Co., 258 F.2d 85 (2d
Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 913 (1959).
59. Terrasi v. S. Atl. Lines, Inc., 226 F.2d 823 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 988 (1955) (doctor's entry in a log concerning injuries sustained
in an accident at sea; timeliness and regularity of recording procedures;
Palmer distinguished as the doctor was not implicated in the causation of
the accident).
60. Act to Establish Rules of Evidence for Certain Courts and Proceed-
ings, Rule 803(6), H.R. 5463, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
61. 318 U.S. 109 (1943), aff'g Hoffman v. Palmer, 129, F.2d 976 (2d Cir.
1942).
Palmer the Court construed the Federal Business Records Act 62
which designated the business qualification as follows: "if made in
the regular course of any business, and if it was in the regular
course of such business to make such memorandum or report.""6
The Palmer courts construed this language as prohibiting admission
under the business records exception of documents prepared in anti-
cipation of litigation, reasoning that the inherent nature of a busi-
ness as business did not include reporting procedures not oriented
toward commercial, profit-making operations.64 In contrast to the
Federal Business Records Act, the proposed Federal Rules of Evi-
dence65 provide the following wording of the regular course of busi-
ness requirement: "if kept in the course of a regularly conducted
business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business
activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compila-
tion."6 The use of the term "business activity" rather than
"regular course of any business" as used in the Federal Business
Records Act 67 seemingly would allow the Supreme Court to revise
Palmer's strict exclusionary rule. If a legitimate non-litigation
business purpose for the accident report can be demonstrated the
Court could allow admission if the other requirements of trust-
worthiness and reliance are met. The rationale could be that a
report's usefulness in litigation does not, ipso facto, prohibit its use
in court. A weighing of purposes of the particular report at trial
could provide a more flexible alternative to the Palmer rule.
With regard to the trustworthiness of accident reports, there
has been a pronounced movement away from Palmer's use of the
motive to misrepresent as a strict exclusionary rule.68 The test
which has evolved is not simply the presence of a motive to falsify
on the entrant's part, but whether this motive is sufficiently
checked by other factors.69 These courts reject the suspicious view
of a venal human nature espoused by the court of appeals in
Palmer" in favor of a more pragmatic approach which examines
all pertinent surrounding circumstances. The rationale in support
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1970).
63. Id.
64. See notes 30-38 and accompanying text supra.
65. Act to Establish Rules of Evidence for Certain Courts and Pro-
ceedings, Rule 803 (6), H.R. 5463, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
66. Id.
67. 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1970). A reinterpretation of Palmer by the Su-
preme Court would affect not only the jurisdictions which have adopted
the Federal Business Records Act, exposing their own construal of the Act
to reevaluation, although not bound by federal law, but also those who have
adopted 'any statutory business records scheme. Adherence to or dissension
from Palmer has occurred irregardless of the statute followed.
68. Fagan v. Newark, 78 N.J. Super. 294, 323, 188 A.2d 427, 442 (1963),
and cases cited therein.
69. Lindheimer v. United Fruit Co., 418 F.2d 606, 608 (2d Cir. 1969).
70. Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1942), aff'd, Palmer v.
Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
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of the pragmatic approach was ably set fort by one commentator
in a criticism of the Palmer decision:
Without pretending that business is free from materialism,
it can at least be said that modern commercial materialism
is not of the stupidly short-sighted variety conjured up by
eighteenth-century judges as a basis for the assumption that
all men would always lie in their own immediate interest
unless subject to the sanctions of the witness stand. At the
very least, the majority opinion in Hoffman v. Palmer
seems unfortunate to the extent that it encourages trial
judges to brand this kind of business record as essentially
unreliable by abrupt rulings made without investigation of
the peculiar circumstances of each case.71
The authority of Palmer has been limited, in fact, to cases where
the defendant seeks to use strongly self-exculpatory accident
records.7 2 Under the pragmatic view, a possible motive to misre-
present is not an absolute bar to admission but rather a factor to
be weighed with others by the trier of fact. It is clear that accident
reports are not and cannot be free from the personal motives of
the preparer and it is properly the trier of fact's task to evaluate
the self-interest and motives underlying the particular report
offered.
A traditional and widely held requirement posed by courts and
authorities to insure the trustworthiness of business records, and
which is equally applicable to accident reports,7 is that the person
witnessing or participating in the event or condition be under a
business duty to honestly report the occurrence. 74 In Johnson v.
Lutz, 75 the leading case on this point, the Court of Appeals of New
71. Note, Hoffman v. Palmer: Admissibility at Common Law and un-
der the Model Act of Business Records Made by a Third Party with Incen-
tive to Misrepresent, 56 HsaV. L. RE. 458, 461-62 (1942).
72. E.g., Fagan v. Newark, 78 N.J. Super. 294, 314, 188 A.2d 427, 438
(1963), and cases cited therein.
73. E.g., Terrasi v. S. Atl. Lines, Inc., 226 F.2d 823 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 350 U.S. 988 (1955) (entry in a ship's doctor's log by a doctor whose
job it was to make such entries); Taylor v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 344 F.2d
281 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 831 (1965) (business duty to honestly
report the facts derived from statutory mandate); United States v.
New York Foreign Trade Zone Operators, 304 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1962).
74. E.g., Pekelis v. Transcontinental & W. Air, 187 F.2d 122, 130-31 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 951 (1951); Fagan v. Newark, 78 N.J. Super.
294, 299, 317, 188 A.2d 427, 429, 439 (1963); see C. McCoamicK, LAW OF Ew-
DENCE § 310 (2d ed. 1972); 5 J. WiamoRo, EvmENcs § 1522 (3d ed. 1940).
Pennsylvania is in accord with this view; see, e.g., Githens, Rexamer
& Co. v. Wildstein, 428 Pa. 201, 205, 236 A.2d 792, 795 (1968) (must be a
business duty and not merely a custom, no matter how long or seriously
relied upon); Broadbent v. A. Moe & Co., 208 Pa. Super. 28, 32, 220 A.2d
340, 342 (1966).
75. 253 N.Y. 124, 170 N.E. 517 (1930).
York disallowed admission of a police memorandum of an accident
made by an officer who had not witnessed the event. The court
reasoned that the bystanders who witnessed the accident and whose
statements formed the basis of the police report were under no duty
to impart such information. The court noted that modern business
records statutes were not intended to permit voluntary hearsay
statements by third parties unconnected with the business and
under no duty in relation thereto to be received in court.76 The
police officer's duty to report the accident would not allow admis-
sion of materials gained through persons unconnected with the
business and under no duty to make a report.
Wigmore is the only substantial authority for the proposition
that an observer or participant in an act or event need have no
business duty to impart such information to others or to record
it himself.77 In Wigmore's view, the modern business records acts
were intended to widen the admissibility of records and under these
acts it is sufficient if someone with a business duty to honestly
record the condition or event eventually does so irregardless of
whether the initial observer or participant was under a business
duty to report.78 Wigmore's view is easily criticized since it is diffi-
cult to show how the trustworthiness of a record can be guarded
when the initial observer or participant is not under a duty to
honestly report the facts. Yet, this view receives some support in
the admission by courts of investigative reports, particularly those
concerning accidents and other cataclysms, containing expert opin-
ions based upon hearsay statements by third parties who are under
no business duty to honestly report the facts. 79 However, investiga-
tive reports containing the opinions of qualified experts are not the
same as the recordation of the facts surrounding the event or condi-
tion as observed by a third party.
Post-Palmer decisions have not changed the requirement of
showing reliance upon the proferred record in the systematic con-
duct of the business in question.89 However, decisions indicate that
the necessary reliance may be based upon the use of the reports
to promote efficient operation,"' expedite the verification of
claims,82 improve medical treatment and procedures8 and promote
safety practices.8 4
76. Id. at 128, 170 N.E. at 518.
77. 5 J. WIGMOpE, EVWENCE § 1530a (3rd ed. 1940).
78. Id.
79. See Pekelis v. Transcontinental & W. Air, 187 F.2d 122, 129-31 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 951 (1951). But cf. Raycroft v. Duluth, Missabe
and Iron Range Ry., 472 F.2d 27, 31 (8th Cir. 1973) (investigative reports
containing expert opinions as usurping the jury's province of deciding on
the facts when the results of the reports are shown to them).
80. See notes 42-48 and accompanying text supra.
81. Fagan v. Newark, 78 N.J. Super. 294, 316, 188 A.2d 427, 439 (1963).
82. Id.
83. Picker X-Ray Corp. v. Frerker, 405 F.2d 916, 924 (8th Cir. 1969)
(dictum).
84. Lindheimer v. United Fruit Co., 418 F.2d 606, 607 (2d Cir. 1969).
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Overlapping all three requirements for admission of business
records, including accident reports, is the regularity of their crea-
tion. Professor Wigmore states: "The entry offered must of course
be a part of a series of entries or reports, not a casual or isolated
one."85 Perhaps the best and easiest rule to apply would be to let
the court pass upon the regularity of a particular record or accident
report as a matter of law with a view toward the circumstances
of its creation."' With reference to accident reports in particular,
it would seem that a systematic effort to record in standardized
form all accidents or incidents occurring within the operation of
a business, to employees and customers alike, would allow a reason-
able assurance of regularity.
Although some courts have adopted a more liberal attitude
toward the admissibility of accident reports in general, this is not
to say that the floodgates should be opened and all business records
and notations, including accident reports, should be admissible.
Reasonable judicial restraint is in order. A representative formula-
tion of the proper attitude to be adopted in determining the
admissibility of business records in general was offered by Justice
Drew of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Freedman v. Mutual
Life Insurance Company of New York.87 In that case the court
stated:
We agree with plaintiff that the [Uniform Business Records
as Evidence] Act did not intend to make relevant that
which is not relevant, nor to make all business and profes-
sional records competent evidence regardless of by whom,
and in what manner, and for what purpose they were com-
piled, or offered.8 8
The mere inclusion of a report of any type with other admissible
records should not permit it into evidence unless it deserves admis-
sion on its own merits.8 9 Courts should approach the question of
the admissibility of business records in general and accident reports
specifically by looking at the whole of the surrounding circum-
stances and decide whether under the three criteria of regular
course of business, trustworthiness and reliance the reports qualify
for admission under this exception to the hearsay rule.
85. 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1525, at 373 (3d ed. 1940) (emphasis in
the original). Under Pennsylvania law the regularity of records is an indi-
cator of trustworthiness. Fauceglia v. Harry, 409 Pa. 155, 160, 185 A.2d 598,
601 (1962).
86. See 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1525 (3rd ed. 1940).
87. 342 Pa. 404, 21 A.2d 81 (1941).
88. Id. at 414, 21 A.2d at 86.
89. People v. Roth, 11 N.Y.2d 80, 84-85, 181 N.E.2d 440, 441, 226
N.Y.S.2d 421, 423 (1962).
C. Admissibility of Hospital Accident Reports
Although most hospital records are, under the modem business
records statutes, considered to be admissible as business records,90
hospital accident reports are rarely admitted into evidence. Yet
this reluctance to admit accident reports does not seem justified.
At least in those jurisdictions which have adopted a liberal approach
toward the admissibility of accident reports in general, hospital
accident reports should also, under appropriate circumstances, be
admissible. When made within the "regular course of business" of
the hospital as defined by the particular jurisdiction, under cir-
cumstances which provide circumstantial guarantees of trust-
worthiness and which are relied upon by the hospital in the regular
course of its business, such reports should be admitted as business
records. Yet the determination as to whether a hospital has com-
plied with these requirements is not an easy task.
First, there is a split of authority as to what constitutes the
business of a hospital. The majority view of what constitutes the
business of a hospital is outlined in Williams v. Alexander.9 In
that decision the Court of Appeals of New York stated:
The business of a hospital, it is self-evident, is to diagnose
and treat its patients' ailments. Consequently, the only
memoranda that may be regarded as within the section's
compass are those reflecting acts, occurrences or events
that relate to diagnosis, prognosis or treatment or are
otherwise "helpful to an understanding of the medical or
or surgical aspects of * * * [the particular patient's] hospi-
talization."
92
Under this view, the records are business records only if "they are
records of a readily observable condition of a patient or of his treat-
90. See C. McCoRMICK, LAW OF EVmNCE § 313(a) (2d ed. 1972); 6
J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1707 (3rd ed. 1940); Hale, Hospital Records as Evi-
dence, 14 S. CAL. L. Rsv. 99 (1941); McCormick, The Use of Hospital Rec-
ords as Evidence, 26 TUL. L. REV. 371 (1952).
Prior to the Palmer decisions and also prior to Pennsylvania's adoption
of the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act in 1939 (PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 28, §§ 9la-d (1958)), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Paxos v.
Jarka Corp., 314 Pa. 148, 171 A. 468 (1934) (Kephart, J.), set forth Pennsyl-
vania's three probative requirements specifically limiting the admissibility
of hospital records. These requirements were: (1) that they were made
contemporaneously with the acts which they purport to relate; (2) that the
background indicates no motivation to falsify the records; and (3), that the
record be made by a person having knowledge of the facts set forth, or one
competent to predicate a medical and scientific opinion on the facts (where
such expert opinion is indicated in the record). Id. at 153, 171 A. at 470-
71. These requirements were adopted under the Uniform Act in Freedman
v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 342 Pa. 404, 412, 21 A.2d 81, 85 (1941),
and they remain the standard by which the trial judge in his discretion ad-
mits regularly kept records into evidence. E.g., Henderson v. Zubik, 390
Pa. 521, 524, 136 A.2d 124, 126 (1957); Haas v. Kasnot, 371 Pa. 580, 586, 91
A.2d 171, 174 (1952) (citing the Freedman rule); Bell Telephone v. Daniel,
16 Chest. 284, 285, 45 Pa. D. & C.2d 717, 719 (C.P. 1968).
91. 309 N.Y. 283, 129 N.E.2d 417 (1955).
92. Id. at 287, 129 N.E.2d at 419 (citations omitted).
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ment."9  The gist of this view is to separate records for purely
medical purposes from those generated for "external and defensive
use. '9 4 Records prepared with a view toward litigation, possible
or certain, are not prepared in the regular course of business.
Although such records may prove helpful to hospitals in litigation,
litigation is not within the orbit of their business as hospitals.
Therefore, these records are not within the business records excep-
tion to the hearsay rule.
However, there has recently emerged some authority which
allows hospital accident reports into evidence because they are
within the business of running a hospital. This view allows admis-
sion to accident reports having a purpose other than looking for-
ward to litigation.9 5 The leading case for this view is Picker X-
Ray Corporation v. Frerker.9 An action for breach of implied
warranties, the decision concerned a radiological procedure in which
the tip of a guide wire of a catheter broke off inside the patient.
Pursuant to regular practice the hospital made three reports. The
first was an incident report by the physician who conducted the
procedure. The second was a supplement to the incident report
made by the business manager of the hospital. The third was an
inter-departmental letter concerning the incident prepared by the
business manager. The first was admitted without objection and
was not discussed.9
7
In its discussion of the two reports made by the hospital's busi-
ness manager, the court of appeals stated that these records could
prima facie qualify as business records under the applicable Mis-
93. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 F.2d 297, 306 (D.C. Cir.
1945). The Pennsylvania position follows a "pathologically germane" test
of admissibility for hospital records as stated by then Chief Justice Maxey
in Commonwealth v. Harris:
Certainly every "act, condition or event" which some hospital
physician places in a hospital record does not ipso facto become
competent when later an issue is being judicially tried to which
such fact would be relevant if proved by competent testimony. The
Act of 1939 obviously means that the 'act, condition or event' re-
corded in the hospital must be pathologically germane to the physi-
cal or mental condition which caused the patient to come to the
hospital for treatment.
351 Pa. 325, 330, 41 A.2d 688, 691 (1945) (emphasis in original).
94. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 F.2d 297, 310 (D.C. Cir. 1945)
(Edgerton, J., dissenting in part).
95. See notes 56-59 and accompanying text supra.
96. 405 F.2d 916 (8th Cir. 1969).
97. The opinion does not discuss the physician's incident report and
thus it leaves a question whether such incident reports by observers or par-
ticipants are readily admissible in the Eighth Circuit or if there was a fail-
ure of timely objection by the defense at trial. An objection must be made
at the time of offering of the record to prevent a waiver. C. McCoRzmcK,
LAW or EviD. cE § 55 (2d ed. 1972).
souri law98 provided they were related to the particular patient's
treatment. 9 However, since in that case the patient's treatment
was not dependent on the report because she had left the hospital
before the business manager heard of the accident, the court held
the records inadmissible.10e The court reasoned that, in order
to qualify as 'business records, accident reports should be motivated
by considerations of hospital administration or technique rather
than possible litigation. The court stated:
Reports even of a business manager or of a hospital ad-
ministrator who was not a participant in the incident, if
more or less routinely made to improve treatment of
patients or hospital procedure, and when not made for the
purposes of litigation, may properly be received as business
records. Reports of the same officer, where the obvious
purpose is to assist in defending litigation, and which result
in the securing of testimony by means of ex parte state-
ments of persons unavailable for cross-examination, not all
of whom are identified, fall within the class of ex parte
statements held inadmissible under Palmer .... 101
Under this view accident reports would, if related to medical treat-
ment or procedures, be included within the concept of a hospital's
business activities. This decision, which would admit records made
for improving treatment of patients or hospital procedure, is in
accord with other decisions which would admit multi-purpose
accident reports but disallow reports with a purpose looking solely
toward litigation.
10 2
The decision in Picker X-Ray follows the logic of the dissenting
opinion of Judge Desmond in Cox v. State'0 3 regarding an accident
report and the "professional business" of a hospital. In Cox, Judge
Desmond reasoned that since the hospital was required by law to
keep such records, 1 4 and thus responsible for their accuracy, the
hospital should not be penalized by their inadmissibility in the de-
fense of a lawsuit for malpractice or negligence. 10 5 Further, even
98. Missouri follows the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act.
Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 490.660-.690 (1952).
99. Picker X-Ray Corp. v. Frerker, 405 F.2d 916, 922 (8th Cir. 1969).
100. Id. at 922-23.
101. Id. at 924.
102. See the cases cited in note 37 supra.
103. 3 N.Y.2d 693, 699, 148 N.E.2d 879, 882, 171 N.Y.S.2d 818, 823 (1958)
(dissenting opinion).
104. Hospitals in New York are required to keep various records, in-
cluding accident and incident reports. See N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW §
35, subd. 7 (McKinney 1971).
105. Statutes requiring mandatory record keeping normally provide
that such records cannot be introduced against the maker by an adverse
party at trial. The logic is that the mandatory nature of the statute should
not put the record maker at a disadvantage by forcing disclosure of unfa-
vorable records over whose generation the maker had no legal control. See
Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 1941-1945, 59 HARV. L. Rzv. 481, 566-67
(1946). Morgan points to the error in the Supreme Court's Palmer decision
in that Palmer reasoned that since the plaintiff was barred from producing
required records into evidence (barred by Act of May 6, 1910 (45 U.S.C.
§ 41 (1940)) the defendant was so barred also under the Act (Palmer v.
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if no statute requiring hospital accident reports was in effect, Judge
Desmond wondered, "how could it be doubted that it was the 'busi-
ness' and prime duty of this hospital's staff to investigate assaults
by one patient upon another?"106 This broader concept of hospital
records, and accident reports in particular, allows admission of vir-
tually all reports concerning events and conditions occurring within
the precincts of a hospital. The only requirement demanded by
Judge Desmond was that either the recorder or observer must have
had personal knowledge of the condition or event.07
Hospital accident reports may satisfy the reliance requirement
of the business records exception to the hearsay rule in several says.
First, in particular circumstances, an -accident report may be ger-
mane to the continued treatment of the accident victim who
remains in the hospital.108 If a person is still a patient after an
accident report is made then the report seemingly would be "patho-
logically germane" to that person's further treatment.109 A fortiori,
if actual reliance upon the accident report by a hospital for treat-
ment of a condition caused by an untoward event within its
precincts can be proved, the report should be admissible. In the
jurisdictions adopting the more liberal view of the admissibility of
hospital accident reports the fact that the accident report may be
used in the prognosis and treatment of a continuing patient is
enough to support its admission by the hospital under the business
records exception to the hearsay rule. 10 Second, long use of rou-
tinely made reports to improve treatment of patients or to reform
hospital procedures may be shown.1 To the degree that actual
systematic use of accident reports to improve hospital services can-
be proved the greater are the chances that a liberal court will look
favorably upon the defendant hospital while balancing admission
against possible motives to misrepresent. Third, some jurisdictions.
also recognize the gathering of detailed information while the rec-
ollection of the accident is still fresh as a legitimate use of rec-
Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 115 (1943), afj'g Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976
(2d Cir. 1942)). The error in Palmer is that no such reciprocity of prohibi-
tions on the records' use is dictated by the Act. Morgan at 566-67.
106. Cox v. State, 3 N.Y.2d 693, 699, 148 N.E.2d 879, 882, 171 N.Y.S.2d
818, 823 (1958) (dissenting opinion).
107. Id. at 700, 148 N.E.2d at 882-83, 171 N.Y.S.2d at 823-24 (dissenting
opinion).
108. See Picker X-Ray Corp. v. Frerker, 405 F.2d 916, 922 (8th Cir.
1969).
109. For the narrower majority view of the business of a hospital see
notes 91-94 and accompanying text supra.
110. E.g., Picker X-Ray Corp. v. Frerker, 405 F.2d 916, 922-23 (8th Cir.
1969).
111, Id. at 924.
ords. 12 Other jurisdictions may carry this further and allow ad-
mission under a definite system of handling all accident claims.118
It should be emphasized that not even the most liberal jurisdic-
tions would admit an accident report totally devoid of non-
litigation motivation. However, if a hospital can prove a genuine
and systematically accomplished business purpose in the generation
of accident reports, many liberal jurisdictions would admit its re-
ports under the business records exception to the hearsay rule.
In regard to the requirement that admissible business records
must be regularly produced, it should be noted that the need for
an accident report arises only when an untoward event occurs.
114
It cannot be created with more frequency or regularity than the
event or condition from which it arises. Therefore, if a hospital's
procedures require a system for the filling out of an accident report
whenever an untoward event or condition occurs, the requirement
of regularity under the business records exception to the hearsay
rule seemingly would be met.
In addition to the general business records statutes several
states have enacted statutes specifically governing the admission
of hospital records.115 Unfortunately, the law construing these
statutes is not extensive and for the most part is co-extensive with
the general business records statutes. The Alabama statute"" men-
tions "injuries" in the context of hospital caused injuries, but its
wording follows that of the Federal Business Records Act" 7 while
the jurisdiction looks with favor upon Palmer."l8 The Maine sta-
tute 1 9 qualifies admission insofar as the records relate to the treat-
ment and medical history of cases. The Massachusetts statute
120
makes a similar qualification to admission of hospital records inso-
far as they relate to the treatment and medical history of cases.
Neither of the last two statutes refers to reports of injuries as
separate from general hospital records.
A hospital wishing to have its accident reports qualify as busi-
ness records under the several business records acts may take some
steps to meet the requirements usually posited, that is, that they
were made in the ordinary course of business, that there was a
trustworthiness tending to negative or discount a motive to mis-
represent, and that there was reliance placed upon the records by
112. See, e.g., Fagan v. Newark, 78 N.J. Super. 294, 299, 305, 188 A.2d
427, 429, 433 (1963); Sullivan v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 161 Minn. 45, 200 N.W.
922 (1924).
113. See 47 MImN. L. Rv. 685, 689 (1963).
114. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
115. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 383 (1) (1960); ME. REV. STAT. AxN. tit. 16,
§ 357 (Supp. 1973-74); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 233, § 79 (1959).
116. ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 383(1) (1960).
117. 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1970).
118. See Nelson v. Lee, 249 Ala. 549, 557-59, 32 So. 2d 22, 28-30 (1943).
119. Ms. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 357 (Supp. 1973-74).
120. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 233, § 79 (1959).
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the business in its usual practices. If a jurisdiction closely follows
the rule of Palmer v. Hoffman121 accident reports will be per se
inadmissible under the business records statutes. However, if a
jurisdiction is inclined toward the more liberal interpretation of
accident reports as admissible under appropriate circumstances or
if a jurisdiction has not yet announced a definite view of the admis-
sibility of accident reports under the business records statutes,
several steps may be taken to insure or at least to help admission
of accident reports.
The pivotal point in the question of admissibility under the
business records statutes is the trustworthiness of the record or
report.122 Anticipation of litigation doomed the accident report in
Palmer23 and it may doom accident reports even in liberal jurisdic-
tions if preparation for litigation is the sole purpose for the report's
generation. 124 Therefore, if a hospital hopes to admit accident re-
ports it should have one or more legitimate non-litigation purposes
for the accident report. Whether non-litigation purposes must
constitute the primary usage of the accident report or whether
a significant secondary use for non-litigation purposes is enough
is a question which is unclear at present. However, the proportion
of litigation versus non-litigation purposes of an accident report
should go to the weight and not to its admissibility. But merely
potential uses likely would not be sufficient; the hospital should
be prepared to demonstrate actual reliance upon the reports by
systematic utilization of them for a business related but non-
litigation purpose.
II. HOSPITAL AcCIDENT REPORTS AND THE
ATToRNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
A. Background
The other side in the proposed dichotomy between hospital acci-
dent reports as records regularly kept in the course of business and
as confidential communications between a corporate client and its
attorney'2 5 is grounded in privilege and therefore is 'an exception
to the general duty to testify. 12 The standard and often-quoted
121. 318 U.S. 109 (1943), afl'g Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976 (2d Cir.
1942).
122. See Annot., 10 A.L.R. FED. § 2[b], at 863 (1972).
123. 318 U.S. 109, 113-14 (1943), aff'g Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976
(2d Cir. 1942).
124. See Picker X-Ray Corp. v. Frerker, 405 F.2d 916, 924 (8th Cir.
1969).
125. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
126. 8 J. WiaMOiE, EVIDENCE § 2182 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
formulation of the attorney-client privilege is found in Wigmore:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought, (2) from
a professional legal advisor in his capacity as such, (3) the
communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confi-
dence, (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently
protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal
adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.
127
Since it is an exception to the general search for -truth at trial,
the attorney-client privilege against discovery and testimony is
strictly construed128 and the burden of proving entitlement to the
privilege is upon the party asserting it.
12 9
Generally, in order for the attorney-client privilege to be suc-
cessfully invoked, courts have required that legal advice be sought,
not merely that there is interrogation by the attorney8 0 or that
the attorney performs an information gathering function. 31 In this
regard, the question usually asked is whether the employment of
counsel is so connected with the latter's professional character as
to afford the presumption that it formed the ground of the confi-
dence reposed. 8 2 Although some jurisdictions require that litiga-
tion be pending or threatened, 3 most follow the better reasoned
view which allows the privilege as long as legal advice is sought.184
The frame of reference for hospital accident reports and the
127. 8 J. WIOMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292 (McNaughton rev. 1961). Pennsyl-
vania's statute establishing the attorney-client privilege is similar in inten-
tion to Wigmore's formulation. See PA. STAT. ANm. tit. 28, § 321 (1958).
128. E.g., City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.
2d 227, 234-35, 231 P.2d 26, 30 (1951); see 8 J. WIrMoIu, EVIDENCE § 2182
(McNaughton rev. 1961).
129. E.g., Robertson v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 520, 540, 25 S.E.2d 352,
360 (1943). On the necessary conditions to be met for a communication to
be privileged see 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
130. Dugger v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 5 F.R.D. 334, 336 (E.D.N.Y. 1946).
131. Hasso v. Retail Credit Co., 58 F.R.D. 425, 427 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
132. Alexander v. Queen, 253 Pa. 195, 201, 97 A. 1063, 1065 (1916).
133. E.g., Robertson v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 520, 539, 25 S.E.2d 352,
360 (1943).
134. 8 J. WrGMoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 2291, 2294 (McNaughton rev. 1961); see,
e.g., Beltzhoover v. Blackstock, 3 Watts 20, 28 (Pa. 1834). Separate and dis-
tinct from the attorney-client privilege is the attorney's "work product" rule
as formulated in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947), and as liber-
alized in favor of discovery. The expected effect of the 1970 amendments
to the FED. R. Crv. P. 26 is that discovery of statements taken by the attorney
himself will be easier (4 J. MooR, FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.6414], at 440 (2d
ed. 1948)). A rule and not a privilege (City of Philadelphia v. Westing-
house Electric Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D. Pa.), mandamus and prohi-
bition denied sub nom. General Electric Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963)), the "work product" rule is
an alternative method for protecting the attorney's mental impressions
gained in preparation for litigation and, indirectly, some information passed
along by clients. As the rules of discovery become more liberalized this
alternative protection of business records from use by an adverse party will
be of less help to hospitals desiring to preserve accident reports from the
discovery process. The recent trend of cases is to equate "good cause" with
relevancy regarding general business records, thus indicating the courts' ad-
herence to the liberal intent of the 1970 amendments (4 J. MooRE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE 28 (Supp. 1973)).
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attorney-client relationship is that of the corporation as client.'3 5
In this respect two main problem areas are encountered. One
problem concerns the proper persons to speak for the corporation.
The second concerns the purpose for which the communication is
made. The remainder of this section will discuss these concepts
and then apply them specifically to hospital accident reports.
B. Authority to Speak for the Corporation
Before the attorney-client privilege can be invoked by the cor-
poration the employee who made the communication must have
been a proper person to speak for the corporation. The courts are
loathe, in the absence of specific orders or authority from the
employer, to permit employees to speak for the corporation. All
employees, no matter how low-ranking, will be regarded as having
authority to speak for the corporation where they have received
explicit directives from corporate management to record all acci-
dents on standard forms which are passed on to attorneys.136
Further, if all other circumstances surrounding the creation of an
accident report indicate an intent of confidentiality, employees may
assume a representative capacity when the report form is explicitly
labelled "CONFIDENTIAL" or has some similar heading. 3 7 Prob-
lems arise when employees lack explicit authority for making confi-
dential reports and courts have proposed several tests for discerning
the confidentiality of communications.
A narrow formulation, known as the "control group" test,
effectively circumscribes the type of employee who may make a
confidential communication to an attorney on the corporation's be-
half. As set forth in City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric
Corporation,38 the "control group" test provides:
135. Extension of the attorney-client privilege to the corporate client
came only recently in Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d
314 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963). But see Gardner, A Per-
sonal Privilege for Communications of Corporate Clients-Paradox or Pub-
lic Policy, 40 U. D-r. L.J. 299, 323 (1963). A corporate client just as much
as an individual person as a client is in the common position of not really
"knowing" the facts because he or it does not understand the significance
of what he or it saw or now remembers. Simon, The Attorney-Client Privi-
lege as Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 952, 954 (1956). Counsel for
the corporate client may help his client to discover and present the contours
of facts which would otherwise remain hidden. Simon at 954-55.
136. See, e.g., Sierra Vista Hosp. v. Superior Court, 248 Cal. App. 2d 359,
56 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1967); Ex parte Schoepf, 74 Ohio St. 1, 77 N.E. 276 (1906);
The Hopper No. 13, [1925] Prob. 52.
137. Accident reports were so marked in Sierra Vista Hosp. v. Superior
Court, 248 Cal. App. 2d 359, 56 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1967), and The Hopper No.
13, [1925] Prob. 52.
138. 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa.), mandamus and prohibition denied sub
[I] f the employee making the communication, of whatever
rank he may be, is in a position to control or even to take
a substantial part in a decision about any action which the
corporation may take upon the advice of the attorney, or
if he is an authorized member of a body or group which
has that authority, then, in effect, he is (or personifies)
the corporation when he makes his disclosure to the lawyer
and the privilege would apply. In all other cases the em-
ployee would be merely giving information to the lawyer
to enable the latter to advise those in the corporation hav-
ing the authority to act or refrain from acting on the
advice.130
A necessary element of this test is that the employee under scrutiny
must have actual, not merely apparent, authority to speak to the
attorney as a corporate representative. 14 0  Although this "control
group" test has been rejected by the court which formulated it,""
the test remains the most usual test for determining who represents
the corporate client in confidential communications to an attor-
ney.
142
The "control group" test narrows the range of employees who
may speak for a corporation to a decision-making echelon. Further,
the test precludes the privilege from arising when an employee is
not in the "control group" and lacks explicit authority under the
principles of agency law to speak on behalf of the corporation to
third persons. 143 This narrow view may therefore severely hamper
a corporation's preferred system for contact with its attorney.
The inadequacies of the "control group" test have caused some
jurisdictions to reject it in favor of a more liberal test.144 A leading
formulation of the broader test was set forth in Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Decker 4 as follows:
We conclude that an employee of a corporation, though
not a member of its control group, is sufficiently identified
with the corporation so that his communication to the cor-
nom. General Electric Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963).
139. Id. at 485.
140. Id. Pennsylvania also follows a scope of authority formulation.
See Davenport Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 166 Pa. 480, 31 A. 245, 246 (1895).
This remains good law in Pennsylvania as Davenport is cited to date only
in Konyk v. Nolan, 156 Pa. Super. 531, 533, 40 A.2d 888, 889 (1945).
141. Hasso v. Retail Credit Co., 58 F.R.D. 425 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
142. 4 J. MooRn, FE ORAL PRACTICE % 26.60[2] (Supp. 1973).
143. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491-92 (7th
Cir.), aff'd by vote of 4 to 4 without opinion, 400 U.S. 955 (1970).
144. E.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491-
92 (7th Cir.), aff'd by vote of 4 to 4 without opinion, 400 U.S. 955 (1970);
Eutectic Corp. v. Metco, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 35, 39 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Hasso v. Re-
tail Credit Co., 58 FR.D. 425, 428 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (overturning its own crea-
tion, the "control group" test); D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court, 60
Cal. 2d 723, 736-38, 388 P.2d 700, 709-10, 36 Cal. Rptr. 468, 477-78 (1964).
Cf. Rucker v. Wabash R.R., 418 F.2d 146, 154 (7th Cir. 1969).
145. 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir.), affd by vote of 4 to 4 without opinion,
400 U.S. 955 (1970).
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poration's attorney is privileged where the employee makes
the communication at the direction of his superiors in the
-corporation and where the subject matter upon which the
attorney's advice is sought by the corporation and dealt
with in the communication is the performance by the em-
ployee of the duties of his employment.
146
Under the Harper & Row test courts would have discretion to
examine the specific circumstances at hand and -decide which em-
ployees are entitled to speak to an attorney in the corporation's
name.147 Realistically, this involves more effort by the courts in
studying individual corporate reporting procedures; however, it
provides a method by which a corporation may adopt a procedure
for facilitating the transmission of information to corporate attor-
neys while maintaining the attorney-client privilege. The more
explicit and obvious the reporting system, the better are the
chances that the courts will recognize the accident reports as privi-
leged. Although the Harper & Row formulation retains the neces-
sity for actual rather than apparent authority to speak on behalf
of the corporation, 48 it widens the number of employees who may
make privileged communications.
The question of who speaks for a hospital when a hospital
accident report is written up 'and sent along to an attorney has not
specifically arisen under either the "control group" test or the
Harper & Row analysis. There seems to be no special consideration
which would alter their applicability to hospitals' corporate struc-
tures. Which test would be applied in such a case depends upon
the individual jurisdiction where the action is brought. However,
the greater flexibility of the Harper & Row test seems to be more
nearly in accord with hospital record keeping practices which
generally include employees not within the ambit of the "control
146. Id. at 491-92. An earlier formulation of this test was pronounced
in D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. 2d 723, 736-38, 388 P.2d
700, 709-10, 36 Cal. Rptr. 468, 477-78 (1964). Therein the court held that
an employee not a co-defendant should not have a privileged status ac-
corded to communications made to a corporate attorney "unless, under all
of the circumstances of the case, he is the natural person to be speaking
for the corporation." Id. at 736, 388 P.2d at 709, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 477. The
communicating employee must be such "a person who would ordinarily be
utilized for communication to the corporation's attorney." Id. at 737, 388
P.2d at 709, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 477. The Chadbourne rule would allow the
privilege to stand when an employee is required to make an accident report
by standing rule or otherwise if the purpose, made known to the employee,
is for confidential transmittal to its attorney.
147. At least one court has held that an employee may speak on behalf
of a corporation irregardless of his status. E.g., United States v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 349, 361 (D. Mass. 1950) (Wyzanski, J.).
148. See note 140 and accompanying text supra.
group."'1 49 If agency can be shown under an explicit mandate or
by a long period of consistent practice ,there appears to be no reason
for prohibiting confidential communications from originating with
these lower-ranking employees.
C. The Purpose for Which the Communication Was Made; the
Requirement of a Confidential Intent
Having decided who speaks for a corporation as a legal client
the next question is whether communications under the attorney-
client privilege must be motivated by and used solely as part of
the attorney-client relationship or whether other uses may be made
of accident reports without destroying the report's confidentiality
and thereby the efficacy of the privilege claimed. The law is not
settled on this point with two different approaches being taken
among the jurisdictions.
The traditional majority view, known as the "sole purpose" test,
is that confidential communications to an attorney can have only
one purpose, that of obtaining legal advice.150 Under this view,
multiple use of a document destroys any intent of confidentiality
and thereby disallows the privilege. At least one court has held
that actual use is irrelevant and that the mere availability of a com-
munication for purposes other than litigation destroys the attorney-
client privilege. 151 Another formulation of the "sole purpose" test
is the "but for" test offered by then Justice Traynor, dissenting
in part, in Holm v. Superior Court:
[I]n any case where reports are made, not only for the
purpose of communicating to the attorney, but for other
purposes as well, the object of the privilege is subserved
only by making those reports privileged that would not be
created but for the purpose of communication.
52
Under this view, the privilege may be successfully invoked only
after separating and disqualifying from the privilege's protection
those corporate records which would have been made irrespective
of any accident and need of legal counsel. 53
The more liberal view would afford a communication privileged
status when its dominant purpose is the transmission of information
to an attorney in the course of his professional employment. The
149. Inpatient medical records are extensive in scope and numerous
persons may make entries under hospital policy. These persons range from
staff physicians, to nurses to allied health personnel. See JOINT COMMIS-
SION ON ACCREDFTATION OF HOsPITALS, ACcREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS;
HOSPITAL AccREDITATION PROGRAM 94-96 (1972 revision).
150. See Note, Agents' Reports and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 21 U.
Cm. L. REV. 752, 754-55 (1954).
151. O'Neill v. Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Author-
ity, 27 A.D.2d 185, 187, 277 N.Y.S.2d 771, 773 (1967).
152. 42 Cal. 2d 500, 512, 267 P.2d 1025, 1031 (1954) (concurring and dis-
senting opinion).
153. In re Hyde, 149 Ohio St. 407, 414, 79 N.E.2d 224, 227 (1948).
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rule, known as the "dominant purpose" test, is stated as follows:
"When the corporate employer has more than one purpose in direct-
ing such an employee to make such report or statement, the
dominant purpose will control, unless the secondary use is such that
confidentiality has been waived.' 154 The "dominant purpose" test
takes into account the realities of modem record keeping. There
are several legitimate uses for accident reports within a corporation
and this test does not penalize one particular use because of a multi-
purpose record utilization system. The dominant purpose among
the multiple purposes for which the document may be made is to
be decided by the court as a matter of law rather than by the trier
of fact.155
The "dominant purpose" interpretation flies in the face of the
traditional "sole purpose" test of attorney-client communications.
Furthermore, it is contrary to the logic of the law of evidence which
seeks to narrow the scope of a protective, exclusionary privilege.1'"
Because of the long standing requirement of confidentiality in the
attorney-client privilege and the modern trend of admitting into
evidence at trial all relevant and non-privileged facts, the "domi-
nant purpose" test is on shaky ground. 157 In addition, the more
stringent requirements of the "sole purpose" test, as opposed to
those of the "dominant purpose" test, protect the opposing party
against subterfuge and after-the-fact manipulation of accident re-
ports 58 which can occur under the "dominant purpose" test.
Under both the "sole purpose" test and the "dominant purpose"
test of privileged communications it is usually held that pre-
existing documents, that is, documents created before a lawsuit is
threatened or brought, do not possess the requisite intent to be
labeled confidential communications to an attorney. 1 9 Although
154. D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. 2d 723, 737, 388
P.2d 700, 709-10, 36 Cal. Rptr. 468, 477-78 (1964). See Holm v. Superior
Court, 42 Cal. 2d 500, 507, 267 P.2d 1025, 1029 (1954); City and County of
San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 235, 231 P.2d 26, 30 (1951).
155. Holm v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 2d 500, 507, 267 P.2d 1025, 1029
(1954).
156. See notes 128-29 and accompanying text supra.
157. See Note, Agents' Reports and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 21 U.
Cm. L. REv. 752, 758-59 (1954).
158. Compare United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461,
465 (D. Mich. 1954) (privilege held waived where communications with
counsel were "indiscriminately mingled with the other routine documents of
the corporation") with United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F.
Supp. 349, 351 (1950) (Wyzanski, J.) (over 800 exhibits accorded privileged
status after being kept with "thousands of strictly intra-corporate docu-
ments").
159. The classic discussion of pre-existing documents in regard to confi-
most jurisdictions require that the intent of confidentiality must
originate in the person who initially makes the accident report for
transmission to an attorney,160 there is some authority which would
allow pre-existing documents to come within the privilege if a sub-
sequent agent in the chain of communications to the attorney pos-
sesses the requisite intent.16'
Regarding communication of accident reports generally, courts
customarily allow the privilege even though an insurance carrier
is an intermediary between the insured and the carrier's attor-
ney.16 2 However, there is contrary authority which holds that a
mere insured-insurer relationship in itself is not enough to infer
an attorney-client relationship in the transfer of an accident report
and that an explicit intent to seek an attorney's help is needed on
the part of the insured. 63 Furthermore, American courts require
actual transfer of an accident report to an attorney to satisfy the
privilege and it is insufficient that it was intended to be subse-
quently transferred when and if needed. 6 4 The rationale behind
this requirement is to prevent a veil of subterfuge which would
cloud the proper use of the privilege.
6 5
The two decisions which concern hospital accident reports as
confidential communications between attorney and client seem to
follow the "dominant purpose" test rather than the "sole purpose"
test. In Sierra Vista Hospital v. Superior Court'6 6 the court fol-
lowed California's "dominant purpose" rule as espoused in D.L
Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court.167 In Sierra Vista Hospital the
hospital administrator had specific instructions from the hospital's
insurance company to complete a confidential accident report and
send it along to the carrier. This order applied to all incidents
which could lead to litigation. The general practice was to prepare
only one copy and to send it to the insurer. The particular
dential communications is found in 8 J. WIGMORE, BENcE § 2307 (Mc-
Naughton rev. 1961). See Nicki v. Schmidt, 351 F. Supp. 385, 391 (W.D.
Wis. 1972); Annot., 146 A.L.R. 977, 980 (1943).
160. 8 J. WiGMoRE, EviD- cE § 2307 (McNaughton rev. 1961). See D.I.
Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. 2d 723, 737, 388 P.2d 700, 710,
36 Cal. Rptr. 468, 478 (1964) ("[I]t is the intent of the person from whom
the information emanates that originally governs its confidentiality.").
161. In re Kleman, 132 Ohio St. 187, 193, 5 N.E.2d 492, 495 (1936).
162. E.g., D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. 2d 723, 738,
388 P.2d 700, 710, 36 Cal. Rptr. 468, 478 (1964).
163. Cote v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 160 Misc. 658, 660, 290 N.Y.S. 483,
485 (N.Y. Munc. Ct. 1936).
164. E.g., People v. Rittenhouse, 56 Cal. App. 541, 546, 206 P. 86, 88
(1922). English courts are more liberal here, allowing the privilege even
when the document was not laid before the solicitor. Intent is seen as con-
trolling and not acts. See Southwark & Vauxhall Water Co. v. Quick, 3
Q.B.D. 315, 322-23 (1878).
165. People v. Rittenhouse, 56 Cal. App. 541, 546, 206 P. 86, 88 (1922).
166. 248 Cal. App. 2d 359, 56 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1967).
167. 60 Cal. 2d 723, 736-38, 388 P.2d 700, 709-10, 36 Cal. Rptr. 468, 477-
78 (1964), as cited in Sierra Vista Hosp. v. Superior Court, 248 Cal. App.
2d 359, 366-68, 56 Cal. Rptr. 387, 391-93 (1967).
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report at issue in the case was prepared in part by the hospital
administrator and in part by the director of nursing services at the
hospital. 168 It was passed along to the insurance carrier by an ad-
juster. The court recognized the several uses of agency, held that
the communications were privileged as a matter of law, and that
the circumstances of each case should determine whether confiden-
tiality was intended and preserved according to the necessities at
fhand.169
Since in Sierra Vista Hospital only one copy of the accident
report was made under the particular hospital's procedure, a rea-
sonable degree of agency was utilized and the top of the form was
captioned "CONFIDENTIAL REPORT OF INCIDENT (NOT A
PART OF MEDICAL RECORD),"17O the decision does not provide
any guidance for the situations where other uses are made of the
report. However, the court held that the original disseminator's
intent controls the accident report's confidentiality 17 1 and that
explicit notice is needed from the insurer to the insured that such
reports are to be used for legal purposes. 72 In order to prevent
misuse of accident reports generated by hospitals the court in Sierra
Vista Hospital required these guidelines to insure the confidential-
lity of such reports.
In Bernardi v. Community Hospital Association'73 the Supreme
Court of Colorado considered whether a report concerning the
plaintiff's "foot-drop" which occurred in the hospital was privi-
leged. Three copies of the "Incident Report" were made and placed
with the plaintiff's chart, the Hospital Administrator and the Direc-
tor of Nurses at the hospital. 74 At trial, a former general counsel
to the hospital testified that such reports were available for routine
inspection by the hospital's attorney regarding threatened or actual
litigation and possible defenses thereto. No plan was uncovered
which showed a definite intent to seek legal advice, and the former
general counsel for the hospital could not vouch for the primary
purpose of the "Incident Reports." Although a -reminder was given
168. Neither the hospital administrator nor the director of nursing serv-
ices witnessed the incident in question. The information contained in the
report was gathered by the director of nursing services who in turn passed
it along to the hospital administrator.
169. Sierra Vista Hosp. v. Superior Court, 248 Cal. App. 2d 359, 367, 56
Cal. Rptr. 387, 392 (1967).
170. Id. at 368, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
171. Id. at 367, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
172. Id. at 368, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
173. 166 Colo. 280, 443 P.2d 708 (1968).
174. Compare this procedure with the routines of filing documents in
note 158 supra.
to all nurses to file reports on all incidents no mention was made
in the instructions of any legal purpose. 175 Under these facts, the
court held the reports not to be privileged.1 6
Although not explicitly adopting any test, the -court's choice
of words indicates a leaning toward a "dominant purpose" analysis
of the intended use of such reports:
It well may be that the practice of making an incident
report resulted from the advice of counsel, but it seems
rather plain that these incident reports were not prepared
for the attorney. Rather, they were prepared for certain
administrative officials of the Hospital and they were avail-
able to the Hospital's attorney if he wished to see them.
"To entitle the party to the protection accorded to privi-
leged communications, the communications must have been
made to the counsel, attorney, or solicitor acting, for the
time being, in the character of legal adviser, and must be
made by the client for the purpose of professional advice
or aid upon the subject of his rights and liabilities.1
77
The language indicates that if one of the purposes, and the primary
purpose, of the "Incident Reports" was for it to be a confidential
communication to an attorney then the privilege would be allowed.
It was significant to the court that no systematic referral of these
reports to counsel was demonstrated and that not all of the "Inci-
dent Reports" prepared were -seen by counsel. 17 8  The court in
Bera rdi rightly placed the burden upon the party claiming the
privilege. 179 This burden was not met specifically because no intent
of a confidential communication to an attorney was evident in those
who initially prepared the reports. 180
The above two cases do not provide a sufficient basis upon
which to postulate any trend among jurisdictions regarding which
test, "sole purpose" or "dominant purpose," should be applied to
hospital accident reports where the attorney-client privilege is
claimed. However, as stated previously, the "sole purpose" test is
the traditional test and it provides more secure safeguards in the
search for truth and narrows one of the obstacles in the path of
that search, namely the attorney-client privilege, and therefore it
is submitted that other jurisdictions should refrain from adopting
the "dominant purpose" test.
175. The instructions given to the nurses were:
Report any incident-no matter how small or unimportant it may
seem-immediately to the Nurses Office, on an Incident Form, at
least two copies. This includes any item lost, etc.
Bernardi v. Community Hosp. Ass'n, 166 Colo. 280, 296, 443 P.2d 708, 715
(1968).
176. Id. at 296, 443 P.2d at 715-16.
177. Id. (citations omitted).
178. Id. at 295, 443 P.2d at 715.
179. See notes 128-29 and accompanying text supra.




In view of the foregoing discussion, the safest course for hospi-
tals to follow in using accident reports as confidential communica-
tions to their attorneys is a cautious one. Hospital accident reports
should be segregated from other hospital records and identified or
labeled "CONFIDENTIAL."'' Only those employees necessary to
the creation, transcription, filing and confidential use of these re-
ports should be allowed access to the confidential files.18 2 Only
necessary employees or agents should be utilized in the transmission
of an accident report to an insurer or attorney.183 To pass either
of the two tests preferably only ,one copy or as few copies as possible
of the report should be made8 4 and then those copies should be
kept in a special file or immediately transferred to the attorney.
Most importantly, the generation and transmission of hospital acci-
dent reports must be accomplished in a systematic manner using
appropriate printed forms and standard outlined procedures for
making the reports and passing them along. A systematic approach
to the utilization of accident reports for hospital malpractice or neg-
ligence litigation under the attorney-client privilege will not insure
successful invocation of the privilege. However, an organized for-
mat will be helpful in proving both that an intent for confidential-
lity existed and that the proper and necessary means were followed
in seeking professional legal counsel.
CONCLUSION
It has been shown that the ability to use hospital accident re-
ports in litigation under the regularly kept records exception to the
hearsay rule depends on whether a jurisdiction follows the narrow
or broad view of what constitutes a business.8 5 Some more recent
decisions have jettisoned the narrow commercially oriented major-
181. See notes 137 and 170 and accompanying text supra.
182. One commentator proposes a balance between access by a group
with a need to know and access by secretaries and file clerks to avoid sub-
stantial inefficiency. Note, Attorney-Client Privilege for Corporate Cli-
ents: The Control Group Test, 84 HARv. L. REV. 424, 429 n.18 (1970).
183. The number of necessary hands through which accident reports
must pass to an insurer or attorney may be few or many. "[T]he number
of hands through which the communication may travel without losing con-
fidentiality must always depend on reason and the particular facts of the
case." Sierra Vista Hosp. v. Superior Court, 248 Cal. App. 2d 359, 367, 56
Cal. Rptr. 387, 392 (1967), citing from D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior
Court, 60 Cal. 2d 723, 737, 388 P.2d 700, 710, 36 Cal. Rptr. 468, 478 (1964).
184. Compare Bernardi v. Community Hosp. Ass'n, 166 Colo. 280, 443
P.2d 708 (1968) (three copies) with Sierra Vista Hosp. v. Superior Court,
248 Cal. App. 2d 359, 56 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1967) (single copy sent directly
to the attorney).
185. See notes 30-31, 32-38, 54-67, 91-107 and accompanying text supra.
ity view of Palmer v. Hoffman'8 8 and have afforded a regular and
organized system of accident record keeping a degree of trust-
worthiness which in turn permits the admission of accident reports
under this exception. Trustworthiness is the key to admission of
these reports, and this trustworthiness will be gauged under several
criteria: that it is the business of the party to make these reports,
8 7
that they are regularly kept in the course of its business, 88 that
they are relied on in running the business, 8 " 'and that there is a
business duty upon the originator of the report to honestly record
the event or condition.1 0  Although retaining a requirement of
trustworthiness for hospital accidenit reports, courts sympathetic to
hospitals beleaguered with malpractice and general negligence suits
may be willing to adopt a liberal view of these criteria, especially
as to what constitutes the ordinary course of business.
On the other hand, a hospital may, on occasion, desire to pre-
vent discovery of these same accident reports by an adverse party
on the grounds that they are protected by the attorney-client privi-
lege. In these situations the two principal questions to be con-
sidered are whether the person had authority to speak on behalf
of the hospital as a corporate client seeking professional legal -advice
and whether the reports were prepared with the requisite intent.
In the absence of explicit authority or orders to employees to speak
on the hospital's behalf to 'an attorney, several tests, such as the
"control group" test'9 ' and the Harper & Row test 92 should be con-
sidered by the court. With regard to the uses for which an accident
report was intended when made, although the "sole purpose" test
remains the majority and better view, 98 the "dominant purpose"
test may be attractive to courts sympathetic to a hospital's defensive
position regarding possible malpractice and negligence suits19 4 and
it may be applied in order to afford greater impetus to the hospital's
legal defense. The best avenue for preserving hospital accident re-
ports as confidential communications under the attorney-client
privilege is to follow a systematic and consciously applied confiden-
tial procedure in filling out and transmitting all accident reports. 95
Anything less would subject hospital accident reports to closer judi-
cial scrutiny in order to insure that an original intent of confiden-
tiality existed and that the necessary means were employed to
achieve that end.
186. 318 U.S. 109 (1943), aff'g Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976 (2d Cir.
1942).
187. See notes 30-31, 32-38, 54-67, 91-107 and accompanying text supra.
188. See notes 37, 85-86, 114 and accompanying text supra.
189. See notes 42-48, 80-84, 108-111 and accompanying text supra.
190. See notes 73-79 and accompanying text supra.
191. See notes 138-43 and accompanying text supra.
192. 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir.), aff'd by vote of 4 to 4 without opinion,
400 U.S. 955 (1970). See notes 144-48 and accompanying text supra.
193. See notes 150-53 and accompanying text supra.
194. See notes 154-58 and accompanying text supra.
195. See notes 181-84 and accompanying text supra.
Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
A hospital which utilizes an accident reporting system, and vir-
tually all of them do,19 6 faces the basic dichotomy that a hospital
accident report cannot be considered as both a -confidential com-
munication protected under the attorney-client privilege and a
regularly kept business record admissible under the business re-
cords exception to the hearsay rule. It is necessary that a hospital
make a choice between two possible uses of the same report. This
choice will depend upon the hospital's needs in malpractice and neg-
ligence suits and the advice of counsel. The choice having been
made, it is incumbent upon the hospital to follow a systematic pro-
cedure for creating, filing and transmitting its accident reports.
Systematization rather than a haphazard filling out ,of hospital acci-
dent reports will insure maximum efficacy of the reports in their
chosen role.
RAYMOND J. ZADZILKO
196. Hospitals are required to keep accident reports by several sources,
including: Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-
78, especially §§ 657(c), 673(e) (1970) (concerns hospital employees);
AM cAN HosPITAL AsSOCwATION AND NATIONAL SAFETY CouNcIL, SAFETY
Gums roR HEALTH CARE INsTrruToNs 32-40 (1972) ("Incident Report Form"
for incidents and near incidents).
